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WHY TAX INTERNATIONAL ATHLETE MIGRATION?The 
‘Coubertobin’ tax in a context of financial crisis 
 
Wladimir Andreff  
 
International athlete migration is not a new economic fact. English football spread to France 
in the late XIXth century simply British players moved to Paris and created a football club 
there, the so-called Racing Club. As early as in the 1950s, the Argentine football player Di 
Stefano, the Hungarian Puskas and the French Kopa were playing together in the Real Madrid 
squad..More recently, the growth of international athlete migration has increased significantly 
in the past fifteen years due to economic globalization and a change in regulation of European 
professional sports (Andreff, 2006a).  
Globalisation has affected the sports economy in its various dimensions (Andreff, 2008). The 
global market for all sporting goods and services, in 2004, was assessed to be in the range of 
Euro 550-600billion. The global market for football is valued at Euro 250 billion. The market 
for all sporting goods is valued at about Euro 150 billion. The value of broadcasting rights 
related to sport events is estimated at Euro 60 billion while the global market for sports 
sponsorship is nearly Euro 18 billion. In 2006, the global market for doping was assessed at 
Euro 6 billion. Even if these figuresare not exact , the trend towards globalization of sport 
business is crystal clear. By the same token, the market for high-level sporting talents has also 
globalized. It is a labour market in which professional players and other highly talented 
athletes are internationally transferred – from a club in one country to a club located abroad. 
International transfers of football players skyrocketed in this global labour market since it was 
entirely de-regulated in 1995. Then, this deregulation has affected international labour market 
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in other professional sports and, finally, in all high level sport. Football recently has become 
the most investigated global market in the sports economy, giving rise to serious concerns 
with regards to transfer of teenage players below the age of 18. In the face of a teenage trade 
sometimes compared to trafficking of human beings or even new (international) slavery, some 
recipes have been suggested to supervise and regulate international athlete migration, 
including the design of a specific taxation. In the new context of financial crisis and global 
economic recession it is as yet unclear if this is likely to put a brake on such migration or to 
boost it. 
The chapter is structured as follows. First, some empirical evidence is provided as regards to 
the magnitude of international athlete migration, including the international transfer of 
teenage athletes or players.Then, the focus is on the economic determinants of such migration 
and some of its outcomes. A model of international player transfer taxation more specifically 
geared towards hindering teenage transfers is elaborated on, which strengths and weaknesses 
are compared to former and existing (FIFA) regulation in football. Did the whole picture 
change with the emergence of current financial and economic crisis? Since the latter is not 
over and an economic analysis of its consequences is not stabilised yet, only some hints about 
its impact on international athlete migration will be sketched in the conclusion.  
 
Empirical evidence of  international athlete migration 
 
The First significant international player transfers in football can be traced us to the 1950s. In 
the same decade, an outflow of baseball players from the Dominican Republic towards North 
American baseball leagues started to becomemore significant . However, it is globalisation of 
the labour market for talents which has really boosted athlete international migration, 
sometimes coined a “feet drain” or, better, a “muscle drain” (Andreff, 2001) by analogy with 
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the long lasting brain drain in the global economy. Such globalisation was triggered by the 
Bosman case (1995) in football. A similar jurisprudence was extended to different sports and 
citizens of Central Eastern Europe and CIS countries by Malaja, Kolpak and Simutenkov 
cases (Andreff, 2006b). Then, in 2000, a Cotonou agreement signed by the European Union 
with 77 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries allowed athlete transfers from the latter area 
under the qualification of “assimilated Europeans”, which means under the same conditions as 
those players who could claim benefiting from Bosman, Malaja, Kolpak and Simutenkov 
jurisprudences. The outcome is a global labour market for player talents.  
After 1995, the international mobility of football players grew and the percentage of foreign 
players in European football leagues was on average more than twice higher in 2008 
compared with 1996. In particular, an increasing percentage shows up in the five major 
European football leagues. According to data collected by Loïc Ravenel and Raffaele Poli 
(Table 1) regarding the five major European football leagues, 38.7% of all players involved in 
2006 were foreign, that is 277 players of which 50.2% had migrated from other European 
countries. We basically witness a North-North international migration in European football. 
English Premier League is the most internationalised labour market in European football. 
Such evidence has triggered the publication of the Meltdown Report, 2007 in the U.K., in 
December 2007, that is a report attempting to understand why the English national squad had 
not been able to qualify for the Euro 2008 final stage. The major reason put forward is that, in 
2007-08, only 196 players in operation in the English Premier championship were not foreign 
while foreigners originated from 66 different countries. This was compared with 23 foreigners 
playing in the Premier League when it was created in 1992. 
 
Table 1: Share of foreign players in professional football, pre- and post-Bosman (%) 
1st division championship 1995 1996 1999 2005 2006 
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England 34 34 37 56 55 
France 18 18 22 36 36 
Germany 19 27 39 50 41 
Italy 14 17 33 31 31 
Spain 20 29 40 28 32 
Source: CIES data base (R. Poli). 
 
Table 2 provides a snapshot of the global market for football players with regards to the thirty 
major exporting (home) and thirty major importing (host) countries. It is to be noticed that 
major European leagues are both exporting and importing, which means that two way trans-
border flows are a characteristics of international athlete migration across major developed 
market economies. The only dividing line among European countries is that some countries 
are net importers of foreign players (England, Greece, Germany, Italy, Spain) whereas some 
others are net exporters (France, Belgium, Portugal, Denmark).  
 
Table 2: Migrant football players in 2008: thirty major leagues 
    
Home country Number of migrant  Host country Average number of 
league football players league foreign players per 
club 
Brasil 551 England 15,6 
France 233 Greece 13,3 
Argentina 222 Portugal 13,2 
Serbia 192 Russia 12,9 
Portugal 121 Germany 12,8 
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Czech Republic 113 Switzerland 11,5 
Croatia 109 Belgium 11,5 
Nigeria 94 Italy 10,4 
Sweden 94 Scotland 10,2 
Germany 92 Turkey 9,5 
Bosnia Herzegovina 91 Spain 9,2 
Cameroon 87 Romania 9 
Slovakia 76 Ukraine 8,8 
Uruguay 71 Norway 8,7 
England 70 Austria 8,5 
Netherlands 66 Netherlands 8,4 
Belgium 64 France 8,3 
Spain 62 Denmark 7,8 
Denmark 60 Slovakia 6,5 
Ivory Coast 59 Bulgaria 6,4 
Poland 59 Sweden 6,4 
Switzerland 49 Hungary 5,9 
Finland 46 Ireland 5,5 
Austria 45 Poland 4,9 
Senegal 45 Slovenia 4,9 
Ghana 44 Finland 4,6 
Romania 44 Croatia 3,9 
Ireland 41 Island 3,8 
Macedonia 41 Czech Republic 3,6 
USA 38 Serbia 2,7 
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Source: CIES data base (R. Poli).   
 
On the other hand, outside Western Europe, some countries appear to be net exporters, first of 
all Brasil, Argentina and Serbia, but also the Czech Republic, Croatia, Nigeria, Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, Cameroon, Slovakia, Uruguay, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Ghana and Macedonia, 
i.e. in a nutshell Latin American, Central Eastern European and African countries. Thus, 
South-North athlete mobility is a crucial facet of international athlete migration, even more so 
than North-North player transfers. Nearly half of foreign players operating in the five major 
European football leagues are originating from developing countries. The percentage is even 
higher if we look at second rank leagues like Belgium or Portugal and second and third 
division clubs of the big five European football countries. For example, in the French 
professional football league (Ligue du Football Professionnel), 50% of foreign players are 
from African countries. Southern (and Eastern European) countries usually are net exporters 
and Northern countries are net importers in player trade with the South (and Eastern Europe). 
France is a typical case in point: 13 out of 45 foreign players who entered the French Ligue 1 
in 2007-2008 were from developing countries while 3 out of 54 players who moved abroad 
have left for a developing country. The balance is a net import of 10 players from developing 
countries. Seen from the South, a similar orientation is witnessed. From 1989 to 1997, over 
2,000 Brazilian players migrated to European football clubs, and they were still 654 to move 
in 2002 up to 857 in 2004 (Table 3). Their major host country is Portugal, then other 
European countries. Hundreds of African and other Latin American football players are 
transferred to European clubs every year.  
 
Table 3: Transfers of Brazilian players abroad 
  2002 2003 2004 
 7 
Total 654 787 857 
Moving to: Nb % Nb % Nb % 
Europe 365 55.8 454 57.7 435 50.8 
Portugal (1st destination) 141 21.6 141 17.9 132 15.4 
Asia 94 14.4 128 16.3 169 19.7 
South America 80 12.2 71 9.0 95 11.1 
Africa 53 8.1 65 8.3 79 9.2 
North-Central America 60 9.2 67 8.5 68 7.9 
Oceania 2 0.3 2 0.3 11 1.3 
 
The same sort of South-North international athlete migration is observed from developing 
countries to North America. 1,300 players in the Major and Minor Leagues Baseball are 
citizens from the Dominican Republic, a number of African and Latin American players 
operate in the National Basketball Association and Czech and Russian superstar players are 
often hired by National Hockey League teams. 
Since the late 1980s, post-communist transition economies from Central Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union became significant net exporters of athletes so that they could 
compare – and indeed compete – with developing countries on the global labour market for 
sporting talents. For example, from 1990 to 1997, over 600 professional football players, 520 
ice hockey players, 300 handball and volley ball players, 100 ice skaters and 20 coaches 
moved abroad from the former USSR (Andreff & Poupaux, 2007). With economic recovery 
in Russia, nowadays a reverse flow has emerged of importing foreign players in the most 
performing Russian clubs, like the 2008 UEFA Cup winner, i.e. Zenith St. Petersburg.  
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Table 4: Geographic distribution of domestic team affiliation, African 2002 World Cup 
players 
Domestic team affiliation Cameroon Nigeria Senegal S. Africa Tunisia Total 
Home country - 2 1 7 14 24 
Africa - - 1 - - 1 
England 4 4 - 3 - 11 
France 7 3 20 - 2 32 
Germany 1 - - 2 1 4 
Italy 3 - - 1 3 7 
Spain 4 1 - - - 5 
Other European 3 11 1 10 3 28 
Rest of World 1 2 - - - 3 
Total 23 23 23 23 23 115 
Source: Gerrard (2002).  
 
The other side of the coin is the selection of players enrolled abroad in an increasing number 
of national squads. During the football World Cup 2006 the overall number of players 
selected in national squads was 736 out of which 392 (53%) were playing abroad. The 2006 
French football squad encompassed 13 players registered abroad. National squads of 
developing (and transition) countries now comprise of many players whose club affiliations 
are outside their home domestic league. This is even more clearly exhibited with African 
national squads participating to the football World Cup final stage (Table 4). For the five 
African squads that qualified in 2002, only 21% of players were affiliated to their home 
domestic league. The same observation is made at each football African Cup of Nations. The 
 9 
extreme case was the Ivory Coast team all the players of which were registered in foreign 
leagues and clubs. 
International teenage player transfers is the mostcontentious and possibly illegal , 
international migration business, since FIFA rules adopted in 2001 absolutely forbid 
transferring from abroad football players below the age of eighteen. Indeed, such transfers 
emerged in the late 1980s, but importing teenage players from developing countries was 
boosted by liberalisation and resulting globalisation of the football labour market after 1995. 
Many clubs increasingly looked for a substitute to more mobile European superstar players in 
recruiting new young and cheap talents in the Third World.  
During the 1990s, 4,809 foreign players, aged from six to sixteen, originating from Latin 
American and African countries were found in Italian football clubs. In the Netherlands, 33 
football clubs had been sued by the immigration office for illicit importation of Latin 
American and African players. Belgian football clubs were – and still are – utilised as 
“nursery hubs” for training African players before their transfer to major European leagues. In 
2000, 15 young African players lodged a complaint in the Belgian court against professional 
clubs and players‟ agents, complaining “trade and trafficking of human beings”. And 
eventually they won (Tshimanga Bakadiababu, 2001). 
Often spotted by players‟ agents at the African Cup of Nations – which is nicknamed the 
“cattle fair” -, teenage players are invited to be tested in European clubs, and recruited when 
the test is successful. When it is not, they are abandoned by both clubs and players‟ agents 
without a labour contract and return airplane ticket to their home country. Thus they are left 
de facto in a position of illegal migrant workers and, sometimes, cracked down by the police. 
Some cases were so much outrageous in France that the French Minister for Sports, Ms. 
Buffet, ordered a report (Donzel, 1999) which confirmed the existing extremely bad practices 
of clubs and players‟ agents as regards to African teenage players. After a decade of such 
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devastating teenage transfers, UEFA reacted in 2001 with a new regulation article 19 which 
stated “international transfer is allowed only if the player is at least eighteen”. However, three 
exceptions left the door open to regulation being circumvented: teenage transfers were 
allowed when their parents move abroad for reasons that are not linked to football, when it is 
a transfer across EU countries, and, when a teenage player is living close to the border of a 
foreign country. As a consequence, teenage muscle drain has not vanished even though it is 
clearly illegal. One can still find some cases reported by the press.For example, in 2002 , Isa 
Mohammed (Nigeria) was transferred to a first division Polish nursery club, and his transfer 
was supposed to develop his international career in a major European football league. 
Unfortunately, he was injured, excluded from the team and eventually abandoned by the club.  
A small, though rapidly increasing, share in international migration of sporting talents comes 
when an athlete or player changes his/her citizenship (naturalisation), which is the most 
visible and sometimes contentious part of muscle drain. The number of naturalized citizens in 
national squads competing at Athens Olympics 2004 and Beijing Olympics 2008 was far from 
negligible (Andreff, 2006b). A forthcoming issue resulting from increasingly numerous 
naturalisations, which has urgently to be dealt with, is what will be the meaning, status and 
recognition of national squads in the future. The Qatari strategy of naturalising African and 
Latin American athletes is of particular concern.  
 
Economic determinants of international athlete migration 
 
Some determinants of international athlete migration are not economic, for instance, when an 
athlete simply follows his/her parents international relocation for non sport motives or looks 
for the opportunity of better training conditions abroad or is willing to practice in a country 
with a better weather and so on. In economic terms and with reference 
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to North-North international athlete migration, a major determinant is wage differentials 
across different sports and different developed market economies. If one compares average 
monthly wages in different sports in a same country, money distribution appears to be very 
much uneven. In 2007, the average individual wage was €44,000 per year in French football 
Ligue 1, €11,000 in Ligue 2, €12,500 in cycling Pro Tour, €7,000 in basketball A (1st 
division), €6,500 in rugby Top 14, and €1,500 in athletics Ligue Pro (about 30 times less than 
in footballs first league). It is crystal clear that the French labour market for sporting talents is 
unevenly attractive to migrant athletes depending on the sport discipline. Available data also 
provides an insight into the impact of  wage differentials in the  same sport across developed 
market economies. For instance, average wage in English football Premier League was 
€145,000 in 2007 (three times higher than in the French league) and €45,500 in second 
division (four times higher than in French second division). This obviously explains why so 
many French football players move to English clubs and so few (if any) English players are 
hired by French clubs.  
A comprehensive explanation of wage differentials between English and French football 
leagues would lead us into an economic theory of professional sports leagues (Andreff, 
2009a) and variants of league regulation in European football (Andreff & Bourg, 2006), i.e. 
beyond the limits of this chapter. In a nutshell, wage differentials are resulting from club 
revenue differentials relying on different club attractiveness and access to gate receipts, 
sponsorship money, TV rights revenues, merchandising and naming
2
. In this respect, English 
football clubs‟ attractiveness is stronger than French clubs. Chelsea could afford a €190 
million payroll in 2007-08, that is 70% of overall payroll for the whole French Ligue 1 (€268 
million). Seen from transferred player revenues, wage differentials trigger their decision to 
move from French to English clubs.  
                                                 
2
 Naming refers to an increasing number of professional sport teams that have sold the naming 
rights for their facilities to private firms. 
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A second determinant is league regulation and its impact on a more or less balanced contest, 
the so-called competitive balance. The more unbalanced a championship, the more a players 
move to a top club of this unbalanced league will translate into a substantial wage increase. 
French players often migrate from the more balanced French Ligue 1 to less balanced Italian 
Lega Calcio, Spanish Liga de Futbol and English Premier League in view of significant wage 
gains. A more unbalanced domestic championship raises the probability of its top clubs to 
qualify for (or even win) the Champions League and then increases revenue expectations for 
players (including bonuses, sponsorship contracts, etc.). Playing in a successful club such as a 
Champions League winner, finalist or semi-finalist will increase the value of a players human 
capital which would materialize in a more profitable international transfer fee afterwards.In 
South-North athlete migration, again wage gap is obviously the most effective determinant. In 
the Brazilian first football league in 2007, average wage was €12,000 while in African 
leagues it was below €2,000 in different countries, seldom over €5,000 anywhere in Africa. 
English and French football wages are extremely appealing, even if paid below average, to 
any Latin American or African player.  
A third  determinant is economic underdevelopment of the Third World – and to some extent 
transition – countries (Andreff, 2001). Developing countries are usually plagued with a 
shortage of sport teachers and coaches, a low domestic sports financing, limited sport 
facilities and equipment, fewer world-level sport performances than developed countries, 
namely few Olympic medals since the number of medals is markedly determined by GDP per 
capita and population of participating countries (Bernard & Busse 2004; Andreff et al. 2008). 
These countries are not capableof  hosting more than a few sport mega-events; they suffer 
from widespread corruption in sport, embezzlements and wage arrears in professional clubs. 
Therefore, for a domestic athlete, moving to the North means that he/she will find there better 
training conditions, better technologies in sport equipment and medical care, better 
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expectations to win at world level and more competitive athletes to compete with. In addition, 
he/she can access a better standard of living and purchasing power in a developed market 
economy. The same determinants obviously apply to teenage muscle drain from developing 
countries. An additional one is the “dream of a personal achievement as a future superstar 
player” in the North with all associated benefits, a dream continuously fuelled by 
unscrupulous players‟ agents painting an enticing – though fallacious - picture of assumed 
advantages.  
Major outcomes of international athlete migration may be sketched as follows. For athletes, 
when a transfer is successful, a major effect is higher wage and revenues, and consequently, a 
better way of life. When unsuccessful, the player is left aside by the host club or resold on the 
labour market or simply abandoned in the case of teenagers. If unsuccessful, a player has to 
drift toward another club, usually in a lower division, or find a way to return home. For host 
clubs, they become multinational companies (Andreff, 2009b) sampling players and coaches 
from different countries. They offer sport shows and events of a better quality due to their 
recruitment of the best players/athletes abroad and they increase their probability to win on 
the pitch. Consequently, they attract more money from fans, sponsors and TV channels. Since 
they earn more money, host clubs for foreign players are more capable to recruit international 
superstars which can prolong their capacity to win, to earn more money and so on, in a sort of 
winners‟ “virtuous circle”.  
With regards to professional sports leagues, the impact depends on whether a host country is 
net importer of players or not. For instance, despite a significant number of French football 
players enrolled abroad, French Ligue 1 had a deficit transfer balance in the early 2000s, 
which jeopardized the league financial equilibrium, due to even more significant imports of 
players from European and developing countries.When it comes to the economic impact of 
importing foreign athletes on the host country‟s economy overall, an obvious gain consists in 
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having higher quality domestic sport contests without having financed the cost for education 
and training foreign players/athletes involved in the domestic championship. With superstar 
foreign players, host countries‟ teams may enjoy winning prestigious (and profitable) 
international contests like the European football Champions League. However, a possible 
“windfall cost” may happen with regard to the host country‟s national squad, as it has been 
witnessed with the English football squad unable to qualify for the final stage of Euro 2008.  
For developing countries which basically are net exporters of sporting talents, the main issue 
is that home country and the nursery club are not compensated – or not enough – for 
educational and training costs they have covered before their players have been transferred. 
An absent or limited compensation deepens the gap between a developing home country‟s and 
a developed host country‟s sports economy and undermines the sporting substance of 
developing countries as well as their expectations and probability to win international contests 
or Olympic medals. Developing countries‟ national squads are often weakened by European 
or American clubs‟ reluctance to release their Third World players, which erodes the home 
country‟s capacity to field its most talented athletes in international contests. And when 
players are released, the national squad of a home country is less and less national in some 
sense insofar as most of its players are expatriate workers. Since they are not compensated 
enough for transferred players, professional clubs and leagues in developing countries remain 
poor and unable to keep their best players or to get a reasonably high price (transfer fee) for 
them on the global market.  
Regarding the role of players‟ and athletes‟ agents, the more they transfer players, the bigger 
their revenues since they levy a percentage on each transfer fee and/or initial wage. Transfers 
of teenage players are illegal and undertaken under outrageous and infamous conditions 
offered to young players. Increasing turnover in the labour force and growing international 
athlete mobility still occur and destabilizes the manpower of many sport teams, with the 
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exception of the richest. Such consequences of free movement in a global market calls for the 
introduction of more regulation.
 
Another outcome is the emergence of an underground (black) 
market for teenage players after the introduction of new FIFA regulations released in 2001. 
These regulations prohibit the transfer of players below the age of 18. With player transfers 
from developing countries, players‟ agents often cheat on player birth dates in order to either 
“rejuvenate” rather old players or give the appearance that a minor player is older than 
eighteen. This „trade‟ is run by unregistered players‟ agents unsupervised by FIFA – therefore 
to outlaw agents (which compose nearly 80% of agents in operation in the French football 
league). Hence, there is a high risk of fuelling the „bung‟ culture of bribes, embezzlements 
and so on, as pointed at by Lord Stevens‟ report (2006) in the U.K.. Sometimes, a conflict of 
interest emerges when there are tight links between host club managers and players‟ 
agents.All in all, developing countries are losers in the athlete migration business. An issue to 
be solved is one of losers‟ compensation by winners basically located in developed host 
countries: clubs, leagues and players‟ agents. This  has not been tackled yet since sport 
globalisation has emerged.  
 
A model of international player transfer taxation: the Coubertobin tax 
 
In the face of similar issues with excess international mobility of short term capital on global 
financial markets, James Tobin, a Nobel Prize winner in Economics suggested to “throw sand 
in the wheels of international finance” and designed a 1% Tobin tax to put a brake on short 
term capital movements (Tobin, 1978). Such a tax has not been implemented so far but with 
the current financial crisis partly resulting from too much free capital movements through 
banks, financial markets, fiscal paradises, etc., the Tobin tax may come back to the fore in the 
coming months and years.  
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Thus it is recommended here   to design and introduce what I call a “Coubertobin” tax on 
international player transfers (Andreff, 2004) with the four following objectives: 
1. The tax is to extensively cover educational and training costs of teenage athletes in 
their home countries. 
2. The tax is likely to slowdown international athlete migration from developing 
countries to professional players markets in developed countries. 
3. The tax should provide a strong disincentive to transferring teenage players or even 
children. 
4. Tax revenues would accrue to a fund for sport development in developing home 
countries and could finance sport facilities building and maintenance, training, sports 
at school and sport for all.  
The idea is to levy the Coubertobin tax at a 1% rate on all transfer fees and initial wages 
agreed on in each labour contract signed by players moving from developing countries with 
foreign partners in developed host countries (for the technicalities of the tax, see the appendix 
below). Regarding transfers of teenage and very young talents, a graduated surcharge would 
be added to the 1% tax itself, the younger the player, the higher rate of surcharge.  
The Coubertobin tax obviously is not designed to be a panacea. A number of issues would 
have to be resolved if one wants such a tax to be enforced. Which would be the accurate body 
to levy the tax and take over tax administration? It could  be a World Bank or UN department 
or an international body specifically created to manage the tax. An international agreement is 
necessary between host and home countries and sport federations; otherwise the tax will not 
be implemented on a global scale, the only relevant scale. Political willingness seems to be 
missing so far in favour of such tax. The current financial crisis with its impact on 
professional finance and a hardened budget constraint on wages and transfer fees might well 
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create a window of opportunity for those convinced that the global market for sporting talents 
must be regulated.  
 
Table 4x: A model of  a Coubertobin tax 
 
FR =  (Pi - r.Vl) . T, if a  >  a1     (1)   
   
FR =  (Pi - r.Vl) . [T + s1 (a - a1)], if a1  < a  <  a2  (2)   
    
FR =  (Pi - r.Vl) . [T + s2 (a - a2)], if a2  <  a  <  a3  (3)   
    
FR =  (Pi - r.Vl) . (T + s3), if a  <  a3    (4)   
  
FR: revenues rose through taxation for home developing countries, 
Pi: international transfer price (fee) + initial annual wage of transferred player, 
Vl: player's value on home country market, 
r: exchange rate between domestic currency and the hard currency of host country, 
T : Coubertobin tax at a uniform rate of 1% for all transferred players, 
s: tax surcharge for players under 18, 
a: player's age at the date of transfer, 
a1: first age threshold below which a tax surcharge is to be paid, 
a2: second age threshold below which a tax surcharge must be deterrent, 
a3: third age threshold below which the tax is prohibitive on transfers of extremely young 
players.  
Example: a1  = 18 years, a2  = 14 years, and a3  = 10 years. 
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If a1  <  a  <  a2 , the tax surcharge s1 = 2% more for each month under the age of 18 at the 
date of transfer; transferring a player of 16 would cost a 48% surcharge). 
If a2  <  a  <  a3 , the surcharge s2 = 10% more for each month below the age of 14 at the 
date of transfer; transferring a player of 12 would cost a 240% surcharge. 
If a  <  a3 , the surcharge s3  = 1000% lump sum tax.  
 
When it comes to regulating international athlete migration, there are at least two other 
options than the Coubertobin tax. A first option is the one adopted in the 2001 FIFA rules. 
First, teenager transfers are prohibited. The problem is that prohibition usually creates very 
strong incentives to either find some excuse that triggers an exception status or develop an 
international black market for teenage players, which already  exists. Second, FIFA rules 
establish training costs compensation for players transferred over twenty-three with a 5% 
solidarity mechanism which distributes compensation on a pro rata basis among all nursery 
clubs involved in a player‟s training from the age of twelve to twenty-three. In a nutshell, the 
comparison between FIFA rules and Coubertobin tax (details in Andreff, 2001 & 2002; 
Gerrard, 2002) comes out with FIFA rules being more profitable over twenty-three, much less 
below eighteen. A main limitation of FIFA rules, comparatively to the tax, is that they are 
restricted to football while Coubertobin tax targets all sports. On the other hand, FIFA rules 
have been adopted while the tax is still in prospect. In some sense, FIFA rules are a step in the 
right direction, but it is not in tackling the less desirable effects of international athlete 
migration.  
A third option is to revert to the pre-Bosman quotas system of domestic players, such as the 6 
+ 5 rule which would compel any football club to field at least six domestic („national‟) 
players, and no more than five foreign players, in each match that counts for a contest. This 
rule is strongly supported by Sepp Blatter, , and more recently he has been joined by the 
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former French State Secretary for Sports, Mr. Bernard Laporte. The incumbent UEFA 
president, Mr. Michel Platini, is apparently less in favour of quotas. Nevertheless, the number 
of “locally trained” players that must be fielded in UEFA contests has been increased from 4, 
to 6 and then 8 players since 2007-08. In the Italian Lega Calcio, the quota is now of at least 
50% Italian players. A quota of locally trained players is also discussed in the French rugby 
Top 14. The concept of a locally trained player is rather blurred and must be further clarified 
in the near future, otherwise it could be considered as an attempt at breaching the Bosman 
ruling and the Treaty of Rome article which guarantees international labour mobility to all EU 
citizens. Finally, the Andrew Webster case at the Sport Arbitration Court seems to be a recent 
U-turn compared with the Bosman case, since it allows a player – considered as a free agent – 
who breaches their  labour contract before the deadline, to obtain a compensation though not 
higher than cumulative wages until the end of contract. This sounds similar to the previous 
transfer fee system which had been abolished by the Bosman case. If player quotas based on 
citizenship were to be re-introduced, they would be subject to criticism by the European Court 
of Justice.  
The most urgent regulation of international athlete migration may well be a quite tighter 
supervision of players‟ agents business. According to FIFA rules those who start up a players‟ 
agent business must exhibit a clean police record, must not be an attorney, must pass an 
interview with his/her domestic football federation and must open a bank deposit in Swiss 
francs. A number of agents do operate without fulfilling these rules. This regulation should be 
more tightly supervised, to say the least. Another option would be to forbid affiliated clubs 
(affiliated to sport federations) to deal with outlaw players‟ agents and to fine those which do 
not align to such rule. Some doubt may be raised about the efficiency of supervision as long 
as players‟ agents and host clubs have converging, confusing or merged interests. Creating an 
international association of players‟ agents on the model of the Bar (association of barristers) 
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has also been suggested (Tshimanga Bakadiababu, 2001) that would define and supervise 
honorariums and fees, and rule the whole agents business. Here again, like for Coubertobin 
tax, such reform requires political willingness which is missing so far. What is urgently 
needed is to build up an exhaustive data collection process about all international transfers (in 
all sports and not only for football as in Poli & Ravenel, 2006) and incurred transfer fee 
amounts. The latter is absolutely unknown and is only publicised through estimates and 
speculation by journalists or through acquaintances with some players. 
 
International athlete migration and regulation in times of crisis 
 
The development of the sub-prime bubble, its propagation into a global financial crisis that 
subsequently triggered a global economic recession may provide new support to economic 
regulation at the world level. Perhaps, time is ripe for implementing such a thing as a 
Coubertobin tax on international labour migration. There are several reasons to consider this. 
First, which is the impact of financial and economic crisis on sport? Based on first 
observations regarding sport financing in Europe (Amnyos, 2008; Andreff, 2009c; Andreff, 
Dutoya & Montel, 2009 a & b), major channels for crisis transmission to sports are household 
and local authority sport expenditures, then government sport budget and private money 
flowing into sports through sponsorship and the media. TheGlobal crisis affects household 
revenues downwards and thus, through a decreasing purchasing power, it shrinks household 
sport consumption expenditures. Let us imagine a 5% cut in household expenditures. If sports 
products and services are normal goods, considered as a usual part of European way of life, 
the decrease of sport expenditures would be about 5% on average since it is the expected fall 
in European GDP in 2009. Deep national disparities will occur around the average, depending 
on how hard each domestic economy will be hit by the crisis – for instance harder in the new 
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EU members (Andreff, 2009d). The crisis may have a substitution effect in household 
expenditures between sport practice (and paying ticketed sport events) on the one hand and, 
on the other hand, sport events that can be watched for free or at a reasonably low price (sport 
TV broadcasts). In fact, sales of sport goods have dropped after September 2008. Adidas sales 
worldwide have dropped by 6% in the first trimester of 2009 and its profit by 97% (Puma‟s 
profit fell by 94%), Nike‟s global sales have decreased by 2% in the same trimester and the 
company has cut 1,400 out of its 35,000 jobs. Shrinking household purchasing power is also a 
threat for professional sports clubs. Stadium attendance has dropped in various sports in the 
past months, but not that much in European football where attendances have still increased in 
English Premier League and German Bundesliga while they are stagnating in French Ligue 1 
and decreasing in Italian Lega Calcio. Another crisis index is that sports specialised 
newspapers, such as L’Equipe in France, are facing a fall in their sales.  
In most EU member countries, local authorities have financed local clubs, athletes and 
infrastructures on the basis of money borrowing from the banking system. As a result, a 
number of local authorities are now indebted to banks which has negative implications for 
sport finance. Local authorities will not be able to maintain existing amounts of sport finance 
or, at least, will select the most significant clubs, athletes, sport events and infrastructures. 
The global economic crisis has obviously an impact on governments‟ budgets. The great bulk 
of fiscal deficit is simply due to the recession crisis itself which lowers tax receipts while it 
increases public expenditures (unemployment, social protection) and debt. Increased public 
debt will have to be reimbursed soon and this will trigger an austerity fiscal policy as soon as 
the deepest of the recession will be over. With 0.01% to 0.88% of government budget in 
European countries, sports ministries will suffer more than other ministries from budgetary 
cuts because of their low priority. 
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Except in a few industries, a number of industrial and commercial enterprises have been  
seriously hit by economic recession since the last trimester 2008, and some of them have gone 
bankrupt. Since their sales and profits are down they reduce their „less useful‟ expenditures, 
including sport sponsorship. Sponsors are changing their strategy towards sports since the 
crisis. Some simply quit sport sponsorship. A number of cases have been witnessed since 
September 2008: Honda, ING Royal Bank of Scotland and Crédit Suisse have left Formula 1, 
Kawasaki has abandoned its Moto GP team, banks have left the golf PGA Tour, Kodak has 
given up Nascar, Nomura the Japan Olympic team, Vodafone has withdrawn from UK cricket 
and horse racing and breached Tiger Woods‟ sponsorship contract one year in advance.  
A second strategy is simply to reduce the amount of sport sponsorship without giving up all 
sport support (AIG, Northern Rock, XL charter, Fortis, Dexia). Sponsors also diminish wages 
of sponsored athletes. Rossignol is bargaining on limiting to half previous wage agreements 
with  skiers‟.  
Other sport sponsors – like Lacoste for example - prefer to concentrate reduced finance on a 
few very high profile professional athletes and clubs, and on sport mega-events. This means 
that amateur sport clubs and events which previously benefited from sponsorship will suffer 
more from financial shortages than professional sports. However, even some professional 
football clubs have found it difficult to attract aa sponsor for 2008-09 like e.g. Aston Villa, 
Sheffield Wednesday and Leicester City.  
In the case of media (TV channels) which basically finance sport through broadcasting rights, 
the crisis impact is less crystal clear. Recession affects advertising budgets of numerous 
enterprises downwards, and this would reduce the revenues offered for broadcasting sport 
events, in general. A countervailing tendency may be the following: if the viewing figures 
were to increase during the crisis, the audience rates of TV channels would increase and its 
attraction for advertisers would increase since, in a period of crisis, enterprises need to reach 
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more potential consumers for their products (in order to maintain sales). On the other hand, 
the number of (sport) TV viewers might well increase during the crisis due to reduced  
purchasing power available for paying for leisure and sport. Moreover, the number of sport 
TV viewers would increase if the above mentioned substitution effect of free sport TV 
broadcasts to sport practice and paid sport shows materialised. A number of broadcasting 
contracts between TV channels and different sports, including football, have already been 
revised downwards in Europe.  
In the current model of professional sport finance
3
, professional clubs can afford pushing 
wages and transfer fees up to acquire superstar players, and do it in a sort of arms race 
(Andreff, 2009a) as long as nobody impose a hard budget constraint and good corporate 
governance on them This applies even in the French and German cases where football clubs 
are more tightly supervised by auditing bodies than elsewhere in Europe (Andreff, 2007a). 
Clubs are often stuck in a vicious circle between increasing broadcasting rights negotiated 
with TV channels in order to cover their wage and transfer fee increases, which in turn 
requires a new negotiation for higher TV rights later on and so on (Andreff, 2007b); such a 
vicious cycle derails into pandemic clubs‟ deficits. Thus, the creeping financial crisis which 
affects European football (Lago et al., 2006), and other professional sports to a lesser extent, 
is going to deepen with the global financial crisis and recession. The English Premier League 
deficit has reached €3.8 billion overall in October 2008, Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool and 
Manchester United being accountable for two thirds of it. The deficit of Spanish Liga de 
Futbol was up to €2.8 billion in December 2008, Real Madrid, FC Barcelona, Atletico Madrid 
and Valencia being the most substantially in the red. As a consequence of such financial woes 
in European football clubs, the mercato
4
 transfer market collapsed in winter 2008-09 due to a 
                                                 
3
 Primarily based on media finance (TV broadcasting rights), then on corporate finance, merchandising, labour 
market (players transfers) and capital market (flotation of clubs‟ shares at the stock exchange), see Andreff & 
Staudohar (2000).  
4
 Mercato is the annual re-opening of the transfer market during the season‟s winter break. 
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sponsorship shortage in French Ligue1, German Bundesliga, Italian Lega Calcio and to a 
lesser degree inSpanish Liga de Futbol. Again, the exception of to this was the English 
Premier League. Eventually, the summer 2009 market for international transfer has also 
slowed down in English Premier League. For the first time in many years, Manchester United, 
Liverpool, Chelsea and Arsenal have spent much less on foreign players than clubs such as 
Lyon, Marseille and Bordeaux. This downward trend is tightly linked to the crisis since it is 
triggered by the sterling pound depreciation in terms of euro and a more stringent English tax 
system (in reaction to the crisis) which hits higher revenueearners , which include football 
players. To compensate for their loss of players, English clubs will have to increase wages 
and transfer fees, which  few of them can afford.  
It might be that the crisis, by itself, would put a brake on international athlete migration in a 
sort of market „self-regulation‟. Does it mean that there is no longer any need for a 
Coubertobin tax? A slowdown in international athlete transfers does not resolve at all the 
issue of outlaw teenage players‟ transfers. There is still a significant room for regulation in 
particular when this global crisisends , and international athlete migrationgains further 
momentum .   
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